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1. Introduction 6
Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC) are ruggedized computing devices 7
used in process automation. They control processes such as manufacturing as- 8
sembly lines, robotics, scientific instruments, and other machinery that requires 9
some sort of logic to regulate its function. PLCs are built to be simple in func- 10
tion, as in the process shown in Figure 1, and also tolerant of severe conditions 11
such as moisture, high or low temperature and dust. PLCs have existed since 12
the 1960s, before cyberattacks in the modern sense were conceived of, and also 13
before remote network access to PLCs was considered. Early PLCs used serial 14
connections, and only much more modern PLCs have acquired network com- 15
munication capabilities via TCP/IP in the form of Modbus known as Modbus 16
TCP, and other, similar protocols. Because PLCs can control valuable, phys- 17
ical equipment, and because control systems can have physical consequences 18
to equipment and human life, their secure operation is critical to maintain- 19
ing safety [1]. False outputs can have catastrophic consequences, as Zetter [2] 20
demonstrates. Tampering with a PLC can have disastrous effects. Therefore, 21
knowing that the correct program is running is essential to safety and security. 22
Prior work has shown that non-intrusive load monitoring can be useful to 23
infer the functionality of electrical systems [3]. Recently, it has been shown that 24
patterns in power current signals can be used to infer activity taking place on 25
a computing system [4, §4]. We hypothesized that power signals (specifically 26
current and voltage) could also be used to detect such activity on a PLC. To test 27
our hypothesis, we conducted experiments running different PLC programs. We 28
also examined the relative importance of various features in the classification of 29
these programs. This paper reports on our approach and our results. 30
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related work on power 31
analysis and machine learning to classify signals. Section 3 briefly describes how 32
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Figure 1: A PLC with inputs, outputs, a power supply, and external programming devices.
we collected data for this power analysis. Section 4 discusses various approaches33
to conduct the classification of time series data, while Sections 5 and 6 illustrate34
the experimental framework used in this study to conduct and evaluate the35
classification of PLC programs. Subsequently, we describe results in Section 736
followed by conclusions in Section 8. Finally, we discuss some limitations and37
future work in Section 9.38
2. Related Work39
Power analysis has long been used for non-intrusive load monitoring. Hart [3]40
was among the first to apply the technique for identifying physical systems by41
their power signatures. More recently, Gillis and Morsi [5] used a single power42
sensor to detect, if and which breaker in an electric system is open and closed,43
respectively. The task was to specify the start time of such events, with very44
characteristic switching signals in the data. The authors used wavelets with a45
supervised and unsupervised learning approach. Liebgott and Yang [6] used an46
active learning approach to identify the usage patterns of a set of household47
appliances which was similar to the previous work in that it also identified the48
start and end signatures in noisy measurement data.49
In computing, power analysis was one of the first methods to extract hidden50
information from computing devices. Cryptographic keys have been a partic-51
ular target of such techniques [7]. In addition, computation stages have been52
derived from power analysis [8]. Power consumption has been exploited for a53
variety of other purposes including the identification of Trojans in integrated54
circuits [9] and to expose a wide spectrum of system-level host information in55
general computing container clouds [10].56
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Also related to our work is the use of machine learning for signal classifica- 57
tion. Llenas et al. [11] studied the performance of machine learning models for 58
classifying wireless signals using a sampling of the power of the signal over time. 59
Acharya et al. [12] used a convolutional neural network (CNN) to distinguish 60
between normal and myocardial infarction (MI) ECG signals. Most recently, 61
Copos [4, §4] identified programs running on high-performance computing ma- 62
chines, applying frequency and wavelet analysis to power signatures. 63
Our approach is different from these existing approaches in that, to the best 64
of our knowledge, none of these prior approaches has attempted to identify the 65
activity running on a PLC. At the same time, our approach builds on essentially 66
all of this prior work by leveraging both data sources (current and voltage) as 67
well as analysis techniques. 68
3. Data Collection 69
A phasor measurement unit (PMU) is a device that measures electrical waves 70
[13]. Specifically, it measures voltage magnitude, voltage angle, current magni- 71
tude, and current angle (i.e., a phasor [14]). We generated and collected the 72
data by running different PLC programs on a single Siemens Simatic S7-1200 73
PLC [15] and collecting power results using a distribution-level PMU (termed a 74
“micro-PMU” or“µPMU” [13]), manufactured by Power Standards Laboratory, 75
that measures power signals at 512 samples per cycle, 60 cycles per second, and 76
outputs samples at 120 samples per second — a much higher frequency than 77
typical transmission level PMUs. We monitored the power draw of the PLC 78
with a dedicated current loop that fed into the µPMU. 79
We sequentially deployed 10 different ladder logic programs (a graphical, 80
low-level programming language) to the PLC that represented typical work- 81
loads (see Table 1). The programs were chosen with two criteria in mind. The 82
first was that they should exercise different parts of the PLCs´ functionality 83
i.e. networking, analog-to-digital conversion etc. We chose these programs as 84
distinguishable from each other in a relatively major way. We then chose some 85
programs that had overlapping PLC functionality. We did this to make our task 86
more challenging and we were interested in determining if even small changes 87
to the same program could be identified. 88
We collected and labeled µPMU data for each of the running programs. 89
Additionally, an “idlestate” was recorded where the PLC was not running any 90
code. This enabled us to find a baseline for our supervised learning approach. 91
We conducted several experiments namely exp6, exp7, exp8, and exp9 at differ- 92
ent times by running different PLC programs. These different experiment runs 93
allowed us to design and test simple and hard problems as described below. 94
Goals and Threat Model. PLCs control a myriad of critically important systems 95
including gas pipelines, electrical power grids, railroad signals, and potable wa- 96
ter distribution. Any malicious activity targeting this device could cause damage 97
to equipment, failure of safety systems, or reckless release of hazardous mate- 98
rial. Attacks on a PLC could come in the form of unauthorized modifications 99
3
to the firmware, configuration alteration or changing the execution control flow100
as described in [16]. For our work, we define misbehavior of a PLC as the in-101
tentional manipulation of the ladder logic code to adversely affect the process102
being controlled. This type of attack could be used to incorrectly switch rail-103
way tracks, mix incorrect amounts of chemicals, disrupt electrical substation104
machinery, cause tank pressure sensors to be read incorrectly, etc.105
Our goal was to determine if the currently running program was the correct106
program. In order to do this, we needed to distinguish between major and very107
minor changes in the programs. Therefore some of the 10 programs were very108
similar to each other (i.e., a constant had a different value) while others were109
very different. Each program was run for 2 minutes for a total of 14,400 “rows”110
(120 samples/second × 120 seconds) of data containing voltage and current111
measurements for each.112
4. Description of the Classification Problem and Approaches113
The µPMU power data we collected was used to train our machine learn-114
ing models. We attempted to classify the PLC programs based on the energy115
consumption profiles recorded by the µPMU. Since current and voltage were116
changing over time as the program was running, we looked at the problem of117
determining which PLC program was running as a time series analysis problem.118
One approach to classifying time-series data is to use manually-engineered119
features from statistical properties of the signal. This approach typically in-120
cludes examining attributes of a time series, such as minimum, maximum,121
mean, standard deviation, and frequency. These attributes can be used to infer122
properties of the time series as a whole or for some distinct window of time.123
However, this approach often requires some domain knowledge about the data,124
such as specific frequency bands and other statistical properties. Image clas-125
sification problems are examples of this approach, where manually-engineered126
features are used by applying certain filters to the image data. Another ap-127
proach to classifying time-series data is in the time domain. In contrast to128
using manually-engineered features for classification problems, in this approach129
the data is looked at, point by point, sequentially.130
To classify each program using the µPMU power data, we tried several dif-131
ferent machine learning approaches including Support Vector Machines (SVM),132
K-Nearest Neighbor (KNN), Random Forests (RF), and Convolutional Neural133
Networks (CNN). In the end, we chose RFs due to their ability to classify large134
datasets accurately with computational tractability, and CNNs due to their ac-135
curacy and ability to classify the data without having to use pre-built filters.136
To test the performance of our models, we used two scenarios representing137
basic and difficult classification problems as defined in Section 5. In both sce-138
narios we also classified programs with significant changes among themselves.139
The overall accuracy of each model was calculated by exact match accuracy —140
that is, the total number of correctly classified programs divided by the total141
number of all the samples.142
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Figure 2: A Schematic of a Random Forest Classifier Random Forest Classifier.
1
n
n∑
i=1
I(Yi = Zi)
where I is the indicator function. 143
4.1. Random Forest (RF) 144
We selected the random forest classifier due to its computational efficiency 145
on large datasets and its ability to handle a large number of input variables 146
as well as its ability to generalize well. Additionally, random forests show the 147
importance of features in the classification which would assist us in deciding 148
which features to keep in our models. 149
To best describe the random forest classifier, we first describe a decision tree 150
classifier. Decision tree classifiers [17] are simple yet powerful models which 151
employ a divide and conquer approach to classification. Data is recursively 152
partitioned into sections based on the best split which separates out one class. 153
The right side of Figure 2 shows a magnified decision tree. 154
Random Forests are collections of these decision trees as shown on the left 155
side of Figure 2. For each sample of data, a number of decision trees’ results are 156
aggregated. The final output is then the class that was predicted the most by 157
the individual decision trees. For our Random Forest model, we leveraged the 158
RandomForestClassifier [18] as part of the scikit-learn package [19] with default 159
parameters. 160
4.2. Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN) 161
Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN) are designed to recognize patterns 162
in images directly from the pixel representation of an image [20]. We decided 163
to try this approach on our dataset, since the current magnitude over time can 164
be thought of as a “picture” of the running PLC program. The input values 165
are related positionally to each other, i.e., nearby values in the time-series of 166
current magnitude are extremely related. 167
A CNN, in contrast to RF, does not require complex feature engineering. 168
Data can be input “as is” into the classifier. This is key because a highly accurate 169
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model can be trained without the need for domain expertise regarding the PLC170
programs. The training phase learns “filters” which become more complex as171
the data propagates through deeper and deeper layers. CNNs recognize simple172
patterns in the initial layers building up to much more complex patterns in the173
final layers. They extract local features by constraining the reactive region of174
the hidden layers to small local patches. Passing through the layers, neurons175
become related to each other, and some become more influential than others.176
Figure 3 shows a typical CNN.177
Figure 3: A Schematic of a typical Convolutional Neural Network.
For any machine learning model, it is important to guard against overfitting178
the data. That is, it is necessary to avoid creating a model that is too highly179
tuned to the idiosyncrasies of the training dataset and hence does not perform180
well on new data. For CNNs, using a “dropout layer” randomly selects neurons181
so as not to continually use the most influential ones as predicting the final182
output. This guards against overfitting by allowing the network to learn different183
views of the data.184
We used Tensorflow [21], an open source library developed by Google for185
dataflow programming of highly computational applications to implement our186
neural network model. The CNN was composed of three layers: two convolu-187
tional layers, then a fully connected layer. The “Softmax” activation function188
was used. It maps the output to c classes as a set of probabilities. The highest189
probability class is assigned as the predicted class.190
Table 1: PLC Program Description
Networking ADC Digital out Description
Idlestate CPU in stop state
program 3 x Reads from Modbus, runs a function on the data and returns decision via Modbus
program 4 x Makes LEDs blink (1s period)
program 5 x x Read switch status and displays on build in LED (all off)
program 6 x x Reads analog value and sends it via modbus
program 7 client x x version 2 of program 6
program 7 server x version 2 of program 3
program 8 x version 3 of program 3 (debug variables present in program)
program 9 x PROFINET Client
program 10 x version 3 of program 3 (release version/no debug variables)
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5. Experimental Scenarios 191
Our experiments were broken up into two different scenarios. These scenarios 192
were of particular interest for testing our hypothesis and being able to use the 193
current approach in monitoring potential real-time manipulation of the PLC. 194
We describe them in the following subsections. 195
5.1. Scenario 1 196
First, we combined all datasets (experiment runs 6, 7, 8, and 9) together 197
and used the result of 5-fold cross validation as the performance indicator. We 198
considered this scenario a useful starting point. Combining all datasets into one 199
big dataset, and subsequently using cross-validation led to higher accuracy than 200
Scenario 2. This was due to the fact that cross-validation’s random selection of 201
the training set contained a small amount of data from each run with its specific 202
random noise, thereby letting the classifier learn the random information for that 203
run. This approach would perform well in an online situation where training 204
data would continuously be added to update the model. 205
5.2. Scenario 2 206
Scenario 2 involved training the classifier on three separate datasets (e.g., 207
experiment runs 6, 7, and 8) and testing on the fourth dataset (e.g., experiment 208
9), i.e., 4-fold cross validation with completely different datasets. This problem 209
was more complex than Scenario 1 because experiments were carried out at 210
different times of the day and different days, and each dataset was subject to 211
influence by external factors such as voltage fluctuations and temperature. This 212
scenario was used to test the robustness of a fixed model that could be trained 213
once and used statically any time in the future without the need for additional 214
online training data. In this scenario, we report the performance measures as 215
the average accuracy achieved for individual classifications of each dataset while 216
training on the rest of the three datasets. 217
6. Classification of PLC Programs for Different Scenarios 218
These scenarios posed significant challenges in classifying PLC programs. 219
Considering the complexity of the classification problem at hand, both time and 220
frequency domains were deemed necessary for our analysis. Therefore, in order 221
to detect subtle differences between PLC programs, we tested our scenarios in 222
both the time and frequency domains individually. This allowed us to more 223
granularly tune our machine learning models’ metaparameters. 224
The µPMU power data was a time series of electrical information collected 225
from the power draw of the attached PLC. It included current magnitude and 226
angle, and voltage magnitude and angle. The data was labeled for each PLC 227
program run, plus the “idlestate” as described in Section 3. 228
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6.1. Feature Engineering229
We applied feature engineering techniques to the data including rolling av-230
erages, time-lagged windows and Butterworth filters.231
The rolling average data was created by calculating the average of the data232
points over a window of time. This window was then slid through the entire233
original dataset to create a new dataset. Rolling averages have the effect of234
smoothing the data. Because it averages all features in a window of time, it235
removes the small variations between successive time intervals which could be236
due to noise. This allowed our machine learning models to more readily focus237
on the signal rather than the noise.238
For time-lagged windows, we combined consecutive values of the current239
magnitude to form a much larger row of input features we defined as a “lag240
window.”241
Let T be a time series of length n, a lag window Wx of T is a sampling of242
length w < n of contiguous positions from T , such that Wt = tx, ...tx+w−1 for243
1 <= x <= n− w + 1.244
We flattened m contiguous current samples into vectors. Each component245
of the vector was a current magnitude at consecutive moments in time. We can246
think of the m values of current magnitude as an m dimensional vector and247
note that within this m dimensional space only a small number of “points” are248
associated with a particular PLC program run.249
Because different PLC programs exhibit varying frequencies within certain250
bands in the spectrum, we used the Butterworth filter—a type of signal pro-251
cessing filter designed to mask unwanted frequencies, and known to give an252
especially flat frequency response in the passband [22].253
Each of these techniques created an alignment-free framework which allowed254
for the fact that the beginning and end points of the program runs were not255
necessarily precisely aligned with the recorded start time. This was due to the256
fact that each program was started manually and the measurement granularity257
of the µPMU was in 1120 ths of a second.258
6.2. PLC Program Classification in Time Domain259
In the time domain, for scenario 1, we used current magnitude and angle, and260
voltage magnitude and angle measurements. For scenario 2 we used only current261
magnitude and angle, as we noted that these measurements are determined by262
the PLC itself and are not dominated by the surrounding environment since the263
PLC only consumes ≈ 3W as opposed to other possible noisy consumers in the264
measurement environment that may consume hundreds of watts.265
In scenario 1 we used each set of timestamped values of these features, as a266
separate row of input. We also applied rolling averages to these features. For267
scenario 2, we applied rolling averages as well as a lag window.268
Through heuristics, we determined that the optimal size for the lag window269
for our data was approximately 6 seconds (m ≈ 720) and a window size of 20270
gave the best for the rolling average. That being said, this result is for our data,271
which, as with all data, has noise of various kinds. Other datasets may have272
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different ideal lag windows and window sizes. In order to identify such datasets, 273
procedures and guidelines are discussed in more detail elsewhere [23]. 274
6.3. PLC Program Classification in Frequency Domain 275
We converted time domain signals into the frequency domain using Discrete 276
Fourier Transform (DFT) [24, 25]. We used individual time series describing 277
a particular feature for a specific PLC program (e.g., the current magnitude 278
for idlestate), and subsequently, we computed frequencies using DFT. Liaw et 279
al. [26] demonstrated that the accuracy of the RF classifier depends on how 280
uncorrelated trees are in the forest. The more uncorrelated trees are in the 281
forest, the more accurate the RF classifier. Therefore, to remove correlations 282
between trees as well as noise, and separate signals so that the individual trees 283
are strong, we used rolling averages and Butterworth filters. Rolling averages 284
(also known as moving averages) reduce the noise in the signals because of the 285
smoothing effect of averages, while Butterworth filters are more versatile and 286
remove unwanted frequencies with a ripple free response [22]. Filter windows 287
were chosen based on the exhaustive search technique. For example, the RF 288
classifier was tested for multiple filter windows (sizes) that were slid through 289
the spectrum. 290
7. Results and Discussion 291
We discuss our results from Tables 2 and 3 separately for frequency and time 292
domains. 293
We also discuss the confusion matrices that show the errors in our predic- 294
tions. Columns are the predictions for each PLC program (or the “idlestate”). 295
For example, in Figure 4a, the first column shows all samples predicted to be 296
“idlestate”, the second column shows all samples predicted as r code10, etc. 297
Rows represent the actual PLC program that was running (or the “idlestate”). 298
The top row shows all samples where the PLC was actually in the “idlestate.” 299
Moving along the row, the mispredictions for “idlestate,” and which programs it 300
was mispredicted as, are shown in the corresponding column. The matrix gives 301
a summary of all mispredictions. All non-zero values outside the diagonal are 302
incorrect predictions. A model with perfect prediction would have a confusion 303
matrix where all values not on the diagonal are zero. 304
We display the confusion matrices as heat maps in order to illustrate the fact 305
that even in the cases of some wrong predictions, the majority of predictions 306
fall into the correct class. This is important because if the model is used over a 307
2 minute window of time, instead of each 0.2 seconds, accuracy would be 100%. 308
We show our accuracy results based on the stricter time constraint to show that 309
our approach can be used to detect a program change within 0.2 seconds of its 310
occurrence. 311
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Table 2: Performance of the Random forest Classifier for two scenarios
Scenario 1 Scenario 2
Without
Roll. Avg.
With
Roll. Avg.
Without
Filters
With
Filtersa
With
Filtersb
All Programs 70.17% 97.7% 11.2% 24.6% 28%
4 Prog. States 77.7% 99.08% 24.2% 28.3% 83%
Filtersa – low pass (with normalized cutoff frequency -2.5E-06)
Filtersb – a low pass (with cutoff frequency -2.5E-06) cascaded with a bandpass filter (4th
order, low cutoff 45 Hz, high cutoff 55 Hz)
7.1. Frequency Domain312
It is clear from Table 2 that the RF classifier performed better for scenario313
1 than scenario 2. For scenario 1, the RF classified more than 70% of programs314
accurately when we trained the classifier using all the datasets. Furthermore,315
the RF classifier’s performance improved from 70% to 77% when a rolling av-316
erage window with a triangular window size of 120 samples (data worth 1 sec)317
was used in the frequency domain. The improved performance of the classifier318
can be ascribed to the rolling average filter that reduced the noise in the sig-319
nals. Similarly, when we used only four program states for classification, the320
RF classifier identified approximately 97.7% to 99.08% of the programs accu-321
rately with and without rolling average filters (Figures 4a and 4b), respectively.322
Correctly predicted programs are shown along the diagonal. The misclassified323
programs (∼ 3%; for all programs) are spread across other cells and do not show324
any pattern, which shows that the RF classifier performed consistently. This325
particular scenario was considered as a simple problem, and the RF classifier326
performed remarkably. Indeed, when the classifier did not perform effectively,327
it was because of the noise in the dataset. Hence, using a rolling average filter328
improved the classifier’s performance significantly.329
Scenario 2 was considered a hard problem, because here we trained the330
classifier on a dataset (combining three different datasets) and testing on a331
completely new dataset (fourth dataset). In this scenario, the RF classifier332
performed poorly and was able to identify programs accurately only 11% and333
24% for for Scenario 1 and Scenario 2, respectively. However, when we used a334
low pass Butterworth filter, the RF classifier showed slight improvements from335
11% to 24% and from 24% to 28% for Scenario 1 and Scenario 2, respectively.336
The classifier performed poorly in identifying all programs (programs with337
major and minor differences). We then tested with a low pass Butterworth filter338
cascaded with a band pass Butterworth filter. This improved accuracy to 83%339
for the four program states (programs with major differences) (Figure 5b).340
Figure 6a compares frequency contents computed for the time series of the341
current magnitude across four program states for Scenario 1. Here, we combined342
all the datasets as described in Section 5. It is clear from Figure 6a that the fre-343
quency contents show different signatures across datasets for different programs;344
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therefore, the RF classifier performed effectively for Scenario 1. Similarly, Fig- 345
ures 6b and 6c compare frequency contents computed for the time series of the 346
current magnitude across four program states for Scenario 2. Figure 6b shows 347
frequencies when a low pass Butterworth filter was applied, while Figure 6c 348
shows frequencies when we filtered signals using low pass and band pass But- 349
terworth filters. It is clear from the frequency contents (Figure 6b) that there 350
is no distinguishable pattern for the RF to detect. For example, r code9 shows 351
different amplitudes for each of the different datasets. Therefore, it is hard for 352
the classifier to perform effectively using these features. Furthermore, Figure 353
6c demonstrates that there are frequency bands across the spectrum where the 354
classifier can grow strong trees, as frequency contents can be distinguished be- 355
tween programs (e.g., PLC programs). Accordingly, the classifier performed 356
relatively better with two filters despite Scenario 2 being a hard problem. 357
7.2. Time Domain 358
As shown in Table 3, for scenario 1, the performance of the RF model in the 359
time domain had 89% accuracy without rolling average and 97% with rolling 360
average using all the available µPMU features (current magnitude and angle, 361
voltage magnitude and angle). The accuracy with only 4 program states rose 362
to 95% without rolling average and 99% with rolling average. When using com- 363
pletely different datasets for training and testing in scenario 2, the accuracy 364
dropped drastically to 20% and 30% with and without rolling average respec- 365
tively. This was due to the fact that many of the programs were too similar to 366
distinguish between. When reducing the PLC programs down to those that were 367
significantly different, the RF model achieved a respectable 71% with rolling av- 368
erage and 76% with lag-windowed magnitude. 369
Figure 7 shows the confusion matrix/heat map for scenario 1 for all pro- 370
grams using rolling averages. As can be seen, the mispredictions are distributed 371
throughout the matrix indicating that there was not a general confusion be- 372
tween any two particular programs and that our technique could be used over 373
some longer window of time to achieve 100% accuracy. 374
Figure 8a shows the heatmap for scenario 2 using lag windows. This model 375
performed relatively well at 76% accuracy. 376
For the CNN model, we only used lag windows and did not perform rolling 377
averages. We did this because the CNN we used was originally designed for 378
image classification, thus we wanted our inputs to be similar to that of an 379
image. For detecting all 10 programs, the CNN did not perform well, (40% 380
in scenario 1 and 30% in scenario 2). We explain this with the fact that the 381
random noise in each experiment is larger than the signature change due to the 382
minimal program changes. However, the CNN performed the best overall in 383
both scenarios for 4 program states at 84%. Of note is that the CNN performed 384
the same on the 4 program states in both scenarios. In this scenario the changes 385
in programs were significant enough to clearly identify each program. 386
Figure 8b shows that the majority of misclassifications occurred due to 387
r code7client being predicted incorrectly as r code9. This may indicate that 388
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portions of r code9 are similar to r code7server (i.e., they both use the network-389
ing function at some point) but not overwhelmingly so, since a preponderance390
of the samples were correctly classified as r code7server.391
8. Conclusion392
Our framework and experiments show that the power signature can identify393
PLC programs as the output of a µPMU using the two machine learning ap-394
proaches of random forests and convolutional neural networks. Our accuracy on395
a single dataset of 10 PLC programs that included programs which were very396
similar, reached 99.08%. Using data from completely separate runs, we could397
still detect major program changes at 84% accuracy.398
In practical terms, once the models are developed, implementation to secure399
an actual system is straightforward and does not require domain knowledge.400
It only entails attaching a µPMU to the PLC and collecting data for a short401
period of time (approximately 5 minutes because a PLC’s cyclic program en-402
sures a signature after a small interval). The model training takes another 30403
minutes. Once training is complete, the model is installed with its associated404
monitoring program which runs constantly, looking for and alerting on detection405
of anomalies. The model does not change unless the PLC program is changed.406
9. Limitations and Future Work407
This study demonstrated the potential for classification of PLC programs408
both in time and frequency domains. We showed that different filters could409
help improve predictions of PLC programs in the frequency domain. Similarly,410
time domain also demonstrated a tremendous potential in the classification of411
various programs. However, data collected on different days resulted in some412
incoherency in signals of the same program between datasets. Moreover, RF413
and CNN classifiers were not able to identify programs with minor differences414
effectively. These issues could be addressed in the future work. It is also desir-415
able to include more complexity in data by using more than one PLC in future416
studies to evaluate the robustness of our method. Future work may involve417
taking advantage of time and frequency domains together by combining the418
two domains. Future work may also include designing a specific filter in the419
frequency domain for a particular problem set. In the time domain, it would420
be interesting to explore how different deeper CNNs would perform when we421
include more features.422
Ensuring cybersecurity typically involves identifying threats in real-time and423
from a variety of different possible origins and threat vectors. Moreover, action-424
able cybersecurity requires higher order defense than detecting simple anomalies425
to identify that something is wrong. We have demonstrated how machine learn-426
ing algorithms can be applied to monitor certain classes of threats to operational427
technology devices controlling cyber-physical systems. However, future research428
will undoubtedly be useful in uncovering solutions to additional classes of cyber429
attacks.430
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(a) Predicting all the PLC pro-
grams using frequencies. Before
computing frequencies, the time
series data were smoothed using a
rolling average filter.
(b) Predicting only four PLC pro-
gram states using frequencies. Be-
fore computing frequencies, the
time series data were smoothed us-
ing a rolling average filter.
Figure 4: Scenario 1 – Confusion matrices for Scenario 1 in frequency domain
(a) Predicting all the PLC pro-
grams using frequencies. Before
computing frequencies, the time
series data were filtered using But-
terworth Filters; a low band filter
was cascaded with a band pass fil-
ter.
(b) Predicting only four PLC pro-
gram states using frequencies. Be-
fore computing frequencies, the
time series data were filtered using
Butterworth Filters; a low band
filter was cascaded with a band
pass filter.
Figure 5: Scenario 2 – Confusion matrices for Scenario 2 in frequency domain
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(a) Scenario 1 – Comparing the
frequency contents across four pro-
gram states for the current magni-
tude. Before computing frequen-
cies, the time series data were
smoothed using a rolling average
filter.
(b) Scenario 2 – Comparing the
frequency contents across four pro-
gram states for the current magni-
tude. The time series data were
filtered using a low pass Butter-
worth Filter before computing fre-
quencies.
(c) Scenario 2 – Comparing the
frequency contents across four pro-
gram states for the current mag-
nitude using Butterworth Filters,
a low pass filter cascaded with a
band pass filter.
Figure 6: Comparing frequency contents for the current magnitude with different filtering
approaches.
Figure 7: Scenario 1 – Time domain RF using rolling averages on all programs.
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Table 3: Time Domain Performance
Scenario 1 Scenario 2
Without
Roll. Avg.
With
Roll. Avg.
Roll. Avg.
Lag
Windowed
RF all programs 89% 97% 20% 30%
RF 4 prog. states 95% 99% 71% 76%
CNN all programs 40% NA NA 30%
CNN 4 prog. states 84% NA NA 84%
(a) Time domain RF using lag
windows on 4 program states.
(b) Time domain CNN using lag
windows on 4 program states.
Figure 8: Scenario 2 – Confusion matrices for Scenario 2 time domain
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